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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
LIMITATIONS
78-12-1.

Time for commencement of actions generally.

Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation
is prescribed by statute.
78-12-25.

Within four years.

Within four years:
(2) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
78-12-26.

Within three years.

Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real
property; except that when waste or trespass is committed by
means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of
action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof;
except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a
domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock7 lf
which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner
has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable
man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the
defendant.
PARTNERSHIP
48-1-15.

Rules determining rights and duties of partners.

(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without
the consent of all the partners.
48-1-28.

Causes of dissolution.

Dissolution is caused:

(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners:
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the agreement.
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite
term or particular undertaking is specified.
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not
assigned their interests, or suffered them to be
charged for their separate debts, either before or
after the termination of any specified term or

4

(d)

particular undertaking,
By the expulsion of any partner from the business
bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred
by the agreement between the partners.

(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners,
where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any
other provision of this section, by the express will of any
partner at any time.
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of
the partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry
it on in partnership.
(4) By the death of any partner.
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership.
(6) By decree of court under section 48-1-29.
48-1-29.

Dissolution by decree of court.

(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall
decree a dissolution whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any
judicial proceeding or is shown to be of unsound
mind.
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of
performing his part of the partnership contract.
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends
to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the
business.
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach
of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so
conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable
to carry on the business in partnership with him.
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried
on at a loss.
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's
interest under sections 48-1-24 or 48-1-25.
(a) After the termination of the specified term or
particular undertaking.
(b) At any time, if the partnership was a partnership at
will, when the interest was assigned or when the
charging order was issued.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 12.

Defenses and objections.

5

(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or
motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or
fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants, Helmut E. Reinicke ("Reinicke") and Allison
Garland ("Garland") object to plaintiffs7 Statement of Facts
6

to the extent that such statements are conclusions of law,
irrelevant and immaterial, and attempt to add facts which are
not part of the record and were not plead or argued in the
lower court.

For example, plaintiffs7 statement that,

"Mueller found that Reinicke was involved with illicit drugs"
is, and has been throughout this case, irrelevant, immaterial,
malicious and defamatory.

The lower court ordered such state-

ments stricken from the pleadings.

Plaintiffs have disre-

garded this order and again make the irrelevant allegation on
appeal.
Plaintiffs make several statements regarding "bribery
payments".

Defendants, as part of their Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint, submitted affidavits of Reinicke and Burt
Randall which explained the payments from Reinicke to be for
part ownership of a boat.

Defendants provided no counter-

affidavit or other evidence to refute these sworn affidavits,
except by their "affidavit" of Allison Garland, which she
withdrew and disavowed subsequent to making.
Plaintiffs state that, "The motive for the burglary
appeared to be an attempt by Reinicke to damage Appellants,
causing them to default on the purchase contract, enabling
Reinicke to retake the business by default according to the
contract of purchase."

This "fact" has never been alleged by

plaintiffs in the proceedings of the lower court.

This

statement is an attempt to improve plaintiffs' position by
adding to the facts.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The district court properly treated defendants' Rule

12(b) Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment under
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and properly granted
summary judgment.
2.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by applicable statutes

of limitation.
3.

Plaintiffs have not properly plead allegations which

would entitle them to a tolling of the statutes of limitation
barring their causes of action.

The trial court, therefore,

properly held the statutes to have run.
4.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to plead causes

of action for which relief can be granted.
5.

Plaintiffs' allegation of racketeering activities

fails to set forth the elements of racketeering with sufficient particularity to state a cause of action for which
relief can be granted.
6.

Plaintiffs were not partners with Reinicke and were

not entitled to a dissolution and accounting of the partnership.
7.

The entry of a guilty plea by Reinicke and Garland in

federal court bribery charges does not give rise to an action
for interference with prospective economic relations nor is it
a "fraud upon the court."
8.

Plaintiffs have had opportunity to amend their

complaint and failed to do so.

Permitting them to further

amend the complaint would be unfair and burdensome to defen8

dants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY TREATED DEFENDANTS' RULE 12(b) MOTION TO DISMISS AS A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56
AND PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense
number (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion shall be treated
as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.
It is within the trial court's discretion whether to
consider matters outside the pleadings.
Students, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).

Strand v. Associated

Once the trial court

exercises its discretion to consider those matters, the motion
to dismiss is properly treated as one for summary judgment.
Lind v. Lvnch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983).
Defendants motion was one for dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The grounds

for the motion were, primarily, running of the applicable
statutes of limitation and failure to state prima facie causes
of action.

In addition, defendants submitted affidavits

explaining payirents made by Reinicke to Burt Randall, which
plaintiffs alleged to have been bribes.
9

Plaintiffs submitted

no affidavits in rebuttal.
While the court could have dismissed plaintiffs7 complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action,
it was proper for the court to treat the matter as one for
summary judgment.

Since the matter was being treated as one

for summary judgment, the provisions of Rule 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure apply.

Rule 56(e) provides, in part:

. . . When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Plaintiffs provided no affidavits or other specific facts
in support of the allegations of bribery or any other allegations in their amended complaint.

Under those circumstances,

the trial court properly concluded that there were no genuine
issues of material fact for trial.

Busch Corp. v. State Farm

Fire & Casualty Company, 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987).

The

court's award of summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate
and proper.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
Civil actions must be brought within the applicable
statutory time periods set forth by statute.

Section 78-12-1,

Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended provides:
10

Civil actions may be commenced only
within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, expect in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by
statute.
This section is essentially the same as the statute in effect
at the time the action was initiated.

For purposes of this

action, only a properly formulated racketeering cause of
action or fraudulent concealment would permit a tolling of the
applicable statutes of limitation.
Plaintiffs' allegations of trespass and conversion
occurred in 1980. The applicable statutes of limitation are
U.C.A. 78-12-26(1) and (2) which provide a three year limit.
Both periods had run prior to initiation of the action.

All

of the limitations for allegations included under plaintiffs'
"negligence" cause of action had run.
The allegations of improper interference with contractual
relations with EIMCO and interference with prospective
economic relations occurred in 1980 and 1981. The period of
limitation is four years and had run.

U.C.A. 78-12-25(2).

The last event in any alleged racketeering cause of
action must have occurred within three years of the time of
filing the action.

U.C.A. 78-12-26(4).

This statutory period

had also run.
Plaintiffs have failed to plead any effective cause of
action which would fall within the statutory periods of
limitation.

11

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROPERLY PLEAD ALLEGATIONS WHICH WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO A TOLLING OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION BARRING
THEIR CAUSES OF ACTION. THE TRIAL COURT,
THEREFORE, PROPERLY HELD THE STATUTES TO
HAVE RUN.
Plaintiffs have failed, as discussed below, to plead an
effective racketeering cause of action which would permit them
to benefit from a tolling or extension of statutes of limitation.
Plaintiffs allege on appeal, without having plead such in
the lower court, that defendants have fraudulently concealed
the alleged conversion of plaintiffs' property.

Plaintiffs

have, at no point in this action, plead the nine elements
necessary to establish a cause for fraudulent concealment.
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980).
Plaintiffs claim that their contract action is not barred
by the running of the statute of limitation.

To begin with,

as in the other causes of action, plaintiffs have failed to
clearly state what basis they have for their "contract
action".

They appear to be relying on a breach of good faith

associated with the alleged burglary.

Aside from that, they

claim, without alleging facts, that "Through intentional and
fraudulent means Reinicke successfully concealed the fact that
a violation of the contract had occurred."

Appellants7 Brief,

Point IV, Page 15.
Plaintiffs' allegations are not consistent with the
facts, as set forth by plaintiffs in their Amended Verified
12

Complaint, paragraph 9, page 7:
June 19, 1980.

(1) A burglary took place

(2) "At that time there was circumstantial

evidence to believe that Helmut [Reinicke] and Burt [Randall]
had committed the offense."
In view of these facts, plaintiffs ludicrously would have
the court believe that "Reinicke successfully concealed the
fact that a violation occurred."

There obviously was no

fraudulent concealment; therefore, the statute of limitation
continued to run and had elapsed before this action was
initiated.
Considering that plaintiffs have failed to provide
allegations or evidence sufficient to toll or extend the
periods of limitation, the trial court could properly find
that the statutes had run, barring plaintiffs' causes of
action.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO
PLEAD CAUSES OF ACTION FOR WHICH RELIEF
CAN BE GRANTED.
Aside from the question of limitation, plaintiffs'
amended complaint fails to plead the elements necessary to
establish their causes of action against defendants.

Plain-

tiffs, in their conversion cause of action, have set forth the
law as it relates to conversion, but have pleaded no facts
establishing a conversion.

Their amended complaint fails to

state specifically what property is alleged to have been
converted by Reinicke or that he possesses the property, that
13

they have demanded return and he refuses to return it. Without such facts, there can be no allegation of "a wrongful
exercise of control over personal property in violation of the
rights of its owner."
1327, 1330 (Utah 1977).

Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d
While such "facts" have been set

forth in plaintiffs' appellate brief, no such allegations were
made in the proceedings in the lower court.
Plaintiffs have also attempted to plead a cause of action
for negligence in reliance upon criminal statutes.

While

statutes may set forth a standard of care, this is not true
for every statute drafted by the legislature.

The Utah

Supreme Court, in Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah
1981) has established criteria which a plaintiff must meet to
rely on a statute for a standard of care.

Plaintiffs must

show, "(1) the existence of the statute or ordinance, (2) that
the statute or ordinance was intended to protect the class of
persons which includes the party, (3) that the protection is
directed toward the type of harm which has in fact occurred as
a result of the violation, and (4) that the violation of the
ordinance or statute was a proximate cause of the injury complained of."

Hall at 850, emphasis added.

Plaintiffs have, in fact, shown only the first of these
elements, that the statute exists.

They then make the con-

elusory, logical leap to conclude "The violation of any one or
combination of the above crimes constitutes a violation of a
significant minimum standard of care and duty imposed by law."
Amended Complaint, page 22. This does not meet the burden
14

imposed by the Utah Supreme Court for imposing a standard of
care from a statute.
Plaintiffs7 allegations of Prima Facie Tort read like a
memorandum rather than a properly framed complaint.

The

general implication is that, if one person feels offended by
another, there must certainly be a tort occurring, regardless
of the facts of the situation.
Plaintiffs simply have not alleged any actions of defendants which fall within a statutory limitation period and have
caused damage to plaintiffs.

They have failed to plead causes

of action for which the court can grant relief.
POINT V
PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATION OF RACKETEERING
ACTIVITIES FAILS TO SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS
OF RACKETEERING WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
A comprehensive discussion of the racketeering cause of
action is set forth in defendants7 Memorandum In Support of
Defendants7 Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike and Motion for
More Definite Statement (in Addendum).
As in plaintiffs7 other allegations, they ignore the time
factors necessary for the requisite events to properly plead
racketeering.

In order to fall within the Utah Racketeering

Act, U.C.A. 76-10-1601, et seq., at least one event must have
occurred after 1981 (the enactment date of the statute).
Except for the "ongoing conspiracy" and the payments by
Reinicke to others, all of the events alleged by plaintiffs
15

occurred in 1980.
In addition, the last event must have occurred within
three years of the time of filing the action.
26(4).

U.C.A. 78-12-

Plaintiffs have failed to plead an effective cause of

action which has satisfied these time requirements and would
qualify as an act under U.C.A. 76-10-1602(1).
Nor have plaintiffs plead the elements of racketeering
with sufficient particularity.

In the only case interpreting

the Utah Racketeering Act in civil actions, Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F.Supp
1042 (D.C. Utah 1983), the federal district court held the
Utah act to be more demanding than the federal RICO act.
Where the federal act requires proving injury from a pattern
of racketeering "with enough specificity to show there is
probable cause the crimes were committed" by the named
defendant, Bache at 1045, under the stricter standards of the
Utah act,
the predicate crimes must be alleged with
particularity. The court can determine
whether the pleadings state a violation of
the Utah Act only if the facts are
sufficient to show that the alleged
activity would be illegal in Utah and
would fall into one of the enumerated
categories.
Bache at 1047, emphasis added.
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon their allegations of
conspiracy to support their charges of racketeering.
conspiracy
"[s]tanding

Although

falls within the enumerated acts of racketeering,
alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a
16

cause of action

under the Utah Act."

Bache at 1048.

To effectively allege conspiracy as part of racketeering

activity, the plaintiffs need to show that the parties

agreed to

commit two or more episodes in furtherance of the

conspiracy, and

that they actually did anything beyond

"conspiring".
Even in their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs fail to
allege

against these defendants:
(1)

That they agreed to commit two or more such
episodes in furtherance of the conspiracy;

(2)

That they did anything beyond conspiring, if
drinking together and otherwise associating
with the other defendants constitutes conspiring;

(3)

A second episode which took place after 1980;

(4)

Any second episode occurring within five years of
of a preceding one and within three years of the
filing of the action;

(5)

Any satisfactory allegation, with sufficient
particularity, of an enumerated racketeering
activity.

Any allegations of an "ongoing" conspiracy must show
facts indicating that the conspiracy is, in fact, currently
engaged in by the parties and causing damage to the plaintiffs.

Allegations of past events, especially ones for which

statutes of limitation have run, do not indicate that a
"conspiracy" is actively agreed to and engaged in by the
parties.
Plaintiffs have failed to meet the time limitations
imposed by statute to bring a cause of action for racketeering.

In addition, they have failed to allege a satisfactory

17

set of elements to make out the racketeering cause of action.
POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT PARTNERS WITH REINICKE
AND WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DISSOLUTION AND
ACCOUNTING OF THE PARTNERSHIP.
"No person can become a member of a partnership without
the consent of all the partners.11

U.C.A. 48-1-15(7).

Though

a partner's interest in the partnership may be conveyed to a
third person, an assignment of partnership interest does not
give the assignee the status of partner.

Benton v.

Albuquerque National Bank, 701 P.2d 1025 (N.M.App. 1985).

An

assignee of a partnership interest is expressly limited by
statute to (1) profits to which the assigning partner would
otherwise be entitled and (2) upon dissolution, the assignor's
interest and an accounting of the other partners.
Though defendant Mueller alleged that he had purchased
Garland's partnership interest in Progressive Machine, plaintiffs have set forth no facts showing that Garland, in fact,
was a partner in Progressive Machine.

One obviously cannot

convey what one does not own.
Even if Garland were a partner in Progressive Machine,
her conveyance of a partnership interest did not make Mueller
a partner with Reinicke.

Reinicke, at no time, agreed or

consented to be a partner with Mueller in Progressive Machine.
Under such a scenario, Mueller would merely be assignee of
Garland, entitled only to profits and Garland's interest,
together with an accounting thereon, upon dissolution.
18

Not

being a partner, Mueller would not be entitled to force a
dissolution of the partnership under U.C.A. 48-1-28 or 48-129.

Because plaintiffs could not force a dissolution, they

likewise were not entitled to an accounting from Reinicke.
POINT VII
THE ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA BY REINICKE AND
GARLAND IN FEDERAL COURT BRIBERY CHARGES
DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
RELATIONS NOR IS IT A "FRAUD UPON THE
COURT".
Plaintiffs rely upon Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v.
Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) for the proposition that the
bribery of a Morton-Thiokol agent constitutes intentional
interference with the prospective economic relations of
plaintiffs.

This reading of the case clearly expands its

applications beyond anything intended by the court.
Plaintiffs have never entered into contractual relations
with Morton-Thiokol.

Nor have they made attempts to establish

economic relations with Morton-Thiokol.

They believe that,

because they might at some future time do so, they have been
damaged.
Such a reading of the case would permit every machine
company in the U.S. who might believe they could get contracts
from Morton-Thiokol to have a cause of action against defendants.
It is clear that, in order to establish a cause of action
for interference with prospective economic relations, there
must at least be some demonstrable damage to the plaintiff.
19

Such damages, in the present case, are clearly speculative and
incapable of being proven.

Lacking the ability to prove such

damages, much less that there was a "prospective economic
relation", plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants.
The guilty plea of Reinicke and Garland to federal
bribery charges does not establish that Reinicke and Garland
likewise bribed an agent of EIMCO.

Nor does Garland's plea

make her disavowal of her earlier "affidavit" a fraud upon the
court.

The pleas are prima facie evidence or conclusive only

that they bribed the Morton-Thiokol agent.

They are not prima

facie evidence or conclusive as to any of the substantive
elements of this appeal.
POINT VIII
PLAINTIFFS HAVE
THEIR COMPLAINT
PERMITTING THEM
COMPLAINT WOULD
TO DEFENDANTS.

HAD OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
AND FAILED TO DO SO.
TO FURTHER AMEND THE
BE UNFAIR AND BURDENSOME

Plaintiffs allegations of burglary and bribery have been
addressed by jury trial in the Third District Court, Civil No.
C-86-7872, Honorable David S. Young presiding.

Plaintiffs

have consistently attempted to have their allegations heard in
two forums, a tactic clearly unfair to defendants.
In addition, plaintiffs have already been given opportunity to amend their original complaint but failed to remove
defamatory and irrelevant material or to cure the deficiency
of their pleadings.
20

Plaintiffs have had several opportunities to present
their alleged "facts" to two courts, resulting in considerable
financial cost to defendants.

To allow plaintiffs another

opportunity to amend their complaint, in view of the lack of
facts presented so far in their pleadings and arguments, would
put an unfair financial and emotional burden upon defendants.
There should be some point at which this litigation can end.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly treated defendants' Motion to
Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment and properly entered
summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Plaintiffs have had

several opportunities, in two courts, to present their
allegations and have not successfully done so.

To permit

plaintiffs to once again amend their complaint and embroil
defendants in legal action where the facts and law do not
justify plaintiffs7 allegations imposes an unfair economic and
emotional burden upon defendants.

The summary judgment

entered by the district court should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1988.

C. Reed Brown
Attorney for Defendants/
Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 16th day of May, 1988, I
caused four copies of the foregoing Respondents7 Brief to be
delivered to Loren D. Martin, Attorney for Appellants, 1200
Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

C. Reed Brown (No. A0446)
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
Attorney for defendants Helmut Rienicke
and Allison Garland (Rienicke)
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 884106
Telephone: (8801) 484-7632

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH TOOL & DIE, INC., and
JUERGEN MUELLER,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS, MOTION TO STRIKE,
AND MOTION FOR MORE :

Plaintiffs,
DEFINITE STATEMENT
vs.
HELMUT E. RIENICKE, et. al.,

CIVIL NO. C86-7931

Defendants.

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants Helmut E. Rienicke and Allison Garland (Rienicke)
submit the following Memorandum in Support of their Motion to
Dismiss,

Motion to Strike, and Motion for More Definite Statement:
POINT I
VARIOUS STATUTES OF LIMITATION HAVE RUN, BARRING
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS.
PLAINTIFFS' ACTION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE DISMISSED.

Plaintiffs' causes of action against these defendants are
barred by the running of the statutes of limitation involved.
tort claim is limited to four years from the occurrence of the
tort.

Utah Code, Section

78-12-25(2) (1953, as amended).
1

The

The statutory periods for burglary and theft (which are
criminal, not civil actions) are four years, respectively.
Code 76-1-302(1)(a).

Utah

These periods have run.

Utah Code 78-12-26(2) sets forth a three year statutory period
for limitation of conversion actions.

The period has run.

Obstructing Justice (a criminal offense) has a two year
statute of limitation period.

Utah Code 76-1-302(1)(b).

The

period has run.
"Commercial bribery" (plaintiffs' term) is a class B misdemeanor with a two year statutory period.
302(1)(b).

Utah Code 76-1-

The period has run.

Because the Utah Racketeering Act, Utah Code 7 6-10-1601 et
seq., does not provide otherwise, the statute of limitation is set
forth in 78-12-26(4) as three years.

The period has run.

The criminal offense of conspiracy carries a limitation period
of four years, if determined to be a felony, Utah Code 76-1302(1)(a) or two years, if determined to be a misdemeanor, Utah
Code 76-1-302(1)(b).

A

civil cause for conspiracy would be

limited to three years, Utah Code 78-12-26, or four years, Utah
Code 78-12-25(2), depending on the nature of the allegations.

All

of these periods have run.
Because all of the statutory periods of limitation have run,
plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for which relief
can be granted and plaintiffs' action against these defendants
should be dismissed.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT BEEN DILIGENT IN PURSUING
THEIR REMEDIES; THEREFORE, THEIR CLAIMS ARE
BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AND SHOULD
BE DISMISSED.
Plaintiffs have alleged actions on the part of defendants
which allegedly have occurred over a long period of time.

In

plaintiffs' vague allegation of Violation of Contract Obligations,
for example, they claim offenses back to 1980.
Plaintiffs have had sufficient opportunity to pursue their
remedies against defendants, have failed to notify defendants of
the actions which plaintiffs found offensive, and have made no
claims for remedy prior to the present action.

This lack of

diligence by plaintiffs bars their action against defendants under
the doctrine of laches.

Plaintiffs7 action against these defen-

dants should, therefore, be dismissed.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ALLEGED ACTIVITIES BY DEFENDANTS
WHICH ARE CRIMINAL OFFENSES FOR WHICH THE CRIMINAL
CODE PROVIDES NO EXPRESS PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION;
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND THE ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Burglary and Theft are criminal offenses.

The elements of

burglary are set forth in Utah Code 76-6-201 to 204 and the
elements of theft are set forth in Utah Code 76-6-401 to 412. In
none of these statutes is there a provision for a private cause of
action for burglary or theft.

(With the exception of 76-6-412(2),

which doesn't apply here).
Obstructing justice is a class B misdemeanor.
306.

Utah Code 76-8-

There is no statutory provision for a private action for
3

obstructing justice.
What the plaintiff calls "commercial bribery" is a class B
misdemeanor under the provisions of Utah Code 76-6-508. The
statute sets forth no private cause of action for bribery.
The criminal offense of conspiracy is set forth in Utah Code
76-4-201 to 202. These provisions specify no private cause of
action.
All of these causes of action alleged by plaintiffs are
criminal activities for which no private cause of action is set
forth in the

statutes.

Because of this, plaintiffs have no civil

cause of action for these specific activities and the actions
against defendants should be

dismissed.
POINT IV

PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
An allegation that conduct of the defendants constitutes
willful and malicious intent and causes damage to plaintiffs does
not, by itself, constitute a separate cause of action.

While the

allegation may be raised as part of another cause of action, by
itself, the allegation does not state a cause of action for which
relief can be granted.

Therefore, this cause of action should be

dismissed.
POINT V
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RACKETEERING
ACTIVITIES FAILS TO SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF
RACKETEERING WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN
BE GRANTED AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
4

Plaintiffs' allegations of racketeering activity give rise
a cause of action under Utah Code Section 76-10-1605(1) which
provides, in part:
A person who sustains
business, or property
eteering activity, in
ticipant, may file an
court. • .

injury to his person,
by a pattern of rackwhich he is not a paraction in the district

Racketeering activites are specifically enumerated in 76-1
602.

They include:
(g)
(h)
(0)
(x)

theft, . . . receiving stolen property, . . .
bribery
obstructing or hindering criminal investigations
or prosecutions
conspiracy to commit any of the above enumerated
offenses.

Section 76-10-1602(4) describes a "pattern of racketeering
activity":
"Pattern of racketeering activity" means
engaging in at least two episodes of racketeering conduct which have the same or similar
objectives, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and
are not isolated events, provided at least one
of the episodes occurred after the effective
date of this part and the last occurred within
five years after the commission of a prior
episode of racketeering conduct.
Broken down, this requires:
(1)

At least two episodes of racketeering conduct
(enumerated acts under 76-10-1602(1)),

(2)

With the same or similar
-

Objectives
Results
Participants
Victims
Methods of commission
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(3)

Not isolated events

(4)

At least one event occurring after 1981

(5)

A subsequent event occurring within five years of an
earlier event.

The Federal District Court for Utah has interpreted the Utah
Racketeering statute in Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy
Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F.Supp. 1042 (D.C. Utah 1983).

In

Bache, the defendant counter-claimed under the Federal RICO Act and
the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act.
The Bache court, in holding against the defendant, found the
allegations insufficient under the Federal Act and held that the
standards of Utah's Act were more demanding than those of the
Federal Act.

Under the

Federal Act, the party bringing the action

must prove injury from a pattern of racketeering activity, "with
enough specificity to show there is probable cause the crimes were
committed."

Bache at 1045.

The Court stated that:

A private civil action under RICO is grounded
upon the premise that a party has twice engaged
in "racketeering activity". . . Before a court
can assess the merit of a plaintiff's. . .claim
it must determine whether there is probable
cause to believe the named defendant committed
the alleged predicate crimes. That determination is possible if the factual basis of
those "acts of racketeering" is set out with
particularity.
Bache at 1045, emphasis added.
Addressing the Utah Act, the court held the Utah statute to be
more demanding than the Federal RICO Act in that it defines a
racketeering activity to be an act illegal under the laws of Utah
rather than merely "indictable" as in the Federal Act.

6

The Court

stated:
Like the Federal Act,. . . the Utah Racketeering Act suggests that the predicate crimes
must be alleged with particularity. The court
can determine whether the pleadings state a
violation of the Utah Act only if the facts are
sufficient to show that the alleged activity
would be illegal in Utah and would fall into
one of the enumerated categories.
Bache at 1047, emphasis added.

j

The Bache court also addressed the allegation of conspiracy as
an element of a racketeering activity.

The court held that the

mere allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient to constitute a
RICO conspiracy.

"Thus, under RICO, a civil conspiracy charge

requires an allegation that a party agreed to commit two predicate
crimes in furtherance of the conspiracy."
added.

Bache at 1047, emphasis

The court also observed that:
Although conspiracy is one of the enumerated
acts of racketeering,. . . conspiracy is not a
separate basis for recovery. It is merely a
crime that may qualify as one of the predicate
acts needed to show a pattern of racketeering
activity. Standing alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a cause of action under
the Utah Act.

Bache at 1048.
Plaintiffs, though making broad allegations against defendants, have failed to allege with particularity the racketeering
activities which would form the basis for a cause of action under
the Racketeering Act.

Plaintiffs7 allegations lack sufficient

factual particularity to permit a court to "determine whether there
is probable cause the defendants committed the alleged predicate
crimes."
7

It is significant that, regarding the burglary, even according
to plaintiffs7 Complaint, "the police did not believe there was
sufficient information for criminal charges".
plaint, paragraph 5 k. at page 9.

Plaintiff's Com-

If the information regarding the

alleged burglary was insufficient to provide probable cause of the
offense, then plaintiffs' more general allegations of the other
offenses certainly cannot meet the threshold requirement for
"probable cause".
Since plaintiffs7 complaint does not satisfy the threshold
requirement of probable cause under the Utah Racketeering Act,
plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for which relief
can be granted.

Therefore, the action for racketeering activity

should be dismissed.
POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS7 ALLEGATIONS OF DRUG USE, DRINKING AND
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BY DEFENDANTS ARE IMMATERIAL,
IRRELEVANT, MALICIOUS AND DEFAMATORY AND SHOULD
BE STRICKEN FROM THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE
12(f), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants, especially defendant
Helmut Rienicke, used drugs, drank frequently and conducted himself
in a criminal manner.

These allegations are immaterial and

irrelevant to the causes of action set forth by plaintiffs and are
malicious and defamatory.
The allegations of drug use have absolutely nothing to do with
the causes of action asserted by plaintiffs.

They should be

stricken.
Plaintiffs rely on the allegations of frequent drinking by
8

Helmut Rienicke and his social involvement with others in places
where drinks are served as the basis for their allegations of
conspiracy among the defendants.

The alleged drinking activities

have no rational relationship with any of the causes of action
which plaintiffs put forth.
in a malicious manner.

They serve only to defame defendants

These allegations should be stricken from

the Complaint.
Plaintiffs frequently allege that defendant, Helmut Rienicke,
committed a burglary of plaintiffs7 premises.

Though such an

allegation might be properly raised in support of plaintiffs'
claims of racketeering activity, the allegation is not set forth in
the racketeering cause of action.

The allegations are spread

throughout the complaint.
If, in fact, such an offense occurred, any liability therefore
has long since expired with the running of the statutory period of
limitation.

The only purpose for continually raising this allega-

tion is to cast a pall upon defendants' characters.

This is a

defamatory use of the Complaint and all such allegations should be
stricken.
Because all of these allegations are immaterial, irrelevant,
malicious, and/or defamatory, they should be stricken from the
Complaint under the provisions of Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as "immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's wide ranging allegations fail to state a cause of
action against these defendants for the reasons set forth above,
9

and the action against defendants Helmut Rienicke and Allison
Garland (Rienicke) should be dismissed.
In the alternative, the court should strike all of the
immaterial, irrelevant, and defamatory allegations of the complaint
and instruct plaintiffs to make a more definite statement of their
causes of action against these defendants.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 198 6.

HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST,
BLAKESLEY & McPHIE

C. REED BROWN
Attorney for defendants Helmut
E. Rienicke and Allison
Garland
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,

Motion to Strike, and Motion for More Definite Statement, postage
prepaid, on the

day of

November, 1986 to:

Loren D. Martin
Attorney for plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

10

C. Reed Brown
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST,
BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
Attorney for Defendants Helmut
Reinicke and Allison Garland
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 484-7632
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
1

WASATCH TOOL & DIE, INC., and
JUERGEN MUELLER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

|
]i
|
;>
)
]
i

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS', REINICKE AND
GARLAND'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case No. C86-7931

HELMUT E. REINICKE, et al.
i

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.

Defendants Helmut E. Reinicke and Allison Garland submit
the following Memorandum in support of their Second Motion to
Dismiss:
Defendants assert that plaintiffs, in their Amended
Complaint, have still failed to state a cause of action against
these defendants for which relief can be granted.

In addition,

plaintiffs have failed to remove the defamatory and irrelevant
allegations from their Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs' Amended

Complaint also reads more like a memorandum than a complaint.
Plaintiffs have attempted to set forth black letter law, but have
1

failed to allege specific facts which would support their allegations against these defendants.

In support of these assertions,

defendants incorporate herein their previous Memorandum in support
of Motion to Dismiss and set forth the following:
DEFAMATORY AND IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs have failed to remove defamatory and irrelevant
allegations from their Amended Complaint.

Though they have changed

the allegations of burglary and theft to "trespass" and "conversion", this does not cure the offense.

On page 4 of the Amended

Complaint, plaintiffs allege "an argument related to the use of
drugs."

On page 5, plaintiffs allege that Reinicke had "been

growing what appeared to be and was admitted to be a marijuana
plant" and that he had been "diistributing to and engaging with
employees in the use of intoxicating liquor and what appeared to be
marijuana," and that Reinicke used "drugs with employees on the
job."

All of these allegations are defamatory and irrelevant to

any of the causes of action claimed by plaintiffs.
THE ENUMERATED CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT REINICKE
Trespass.
The plaintiffs have alleged against defendant Reinicke a
"trespass" which occurred in 1980. The applicable statute of
limitation is U.C.A. 78-12-26(1) which provides for a three year
limitation.

This period has long since run.

Conversion
Plaintiffs have failed to allege the elements of conversion, including the specific property alleged to have been conver2

ted by defendant Reinicke.
than the facts.

They prefer to set forth the law rather

In addition to improperly pleading the conversion,

plaintiffs have waited beyond the three year period of limitation
set forth in U.C.A. 78-12-26(2) for bringing their action.
Negligence
Plaintiffs have attempted to use the criminal statutes to
impose upon defendants a new standard for negligence.

While

statutes may set forth a standard of care, this is not true for
every statute drafted by the legislature.

The Utah Supreme Court,

in Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981), has established
criteria which a plaintiff must meet in order to rely on a statute
for a standard of care.

The plaintiff must show, "(1) the exis-

tence of the statute or ordinance, (2) that the statute or ordinance was intended to protect the class of persons which includes
the party, (3) that the protection is directed toward the type of
harm which has in fact occurred as a result of the violation, and
(4) that the violation of the ordinance or statute was a proximate
cause of the injury complained of." Hall at 850, emphasis added.
Plaintiffs have, in fact, shown only the first of these
elements, that the statute exists.

They then make the conclusory,

logical leap to conclude "The violation of any one or combination
of the above crimes consitutes a violation of a significant minimum
standard of care and duty imposed by law."
22.

Amended Complaint, page

This does not meet the burden imposed by the Utah Supreme

Court for imposing a standard of care from a statute.
Since plaintiffs rely on a non-existent standard of care,
3

they are unable to allege a violation of a standard sufficient to
support a claim of negligence against defendant Reinicke.
As with plaintiffs' other allegations, the statutes of
limitations for all of the offenses included under their "negligence" cause of action have run.
Improper Interference With Contract
Plaintiffs allege that Reinicke improperly interfered with
plaintiffs' contractual relations with EIMCO.
fails on several accounts.

This cause of action

First, the alleged actions and damages

occurred in 1980 and 1981. The statutory period of limitation for
this type of action is four years. U.C.A. 78-12-25(2).

Plaintiffs

have failed to take action within the prescribed period.
Second, the sale of defendant Reinicke's interest in
Wasatch Tool to Mueller did not include any sort of non-competition
agreement.

Defendant Reinicke was free to enter business in compe-

tition with Wasatch Tool.
a

This includes competition for work from

major customer like EIMCO.

The mere fact that plaintiffs' work

from EIMCO amounted to an increasingly smaller percentage of plaintiffs' overall business does not, of itself, imply an improper
interference by Reinicke, but could be a result of legitimate
competition.
Plaintiffs allege that payments made by Reinicke to defendants Burt Randall and John Ward constituted bribes to divert work
from plaintiffs to defendant Reinicke.

However, plaintiffs acknow-

ledge that Ward did work for Reinicke, though they imagine this
work to be a subterfuge to conceal the purpose of the payments.
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They do not adequately explain why someone would work for money
which is allegedly already given to him as a bribe.
Regarding payments made by Reinicke to defendant Burt
Randall, the Court has affidavits of both parties which explain
that the payments were made for the purchase of a half-interest in
a boat owned by both men.

Plaintiffs have failed to allege

contrary facts which would support their bribery claims.
Interestingly, plaintiffs also fail to allege facts which
show the existence of an enforceable contract between plaintiffs
and EIMCO which defendants could have interfered with.

Plaintiffs

also have made no effort to bring an action against EIMCO for
breach of their "contract", an indication that perhaps no contract
existed.
Because the statute of limitation has run and because there
are no facts supporting plaintiffs' allegations, plaintiffs have
failed to plead a cause of action for interference with contract
for which relief can be granted.
Interference With Prospective Economic Relations
Plaintiffs' claim for this cause of action relies heavily
on the allegations of commercial bribery based on payments made by
Reinicke.

These payments have been explained above.

Even if these allegations made out a cause of action, it
would be barred by the running of the statute of limitation as in
all of plaintiffs' other allegations.
Since there was no improper means of interference, i.e.
commercial bribery, defendant Reinicke's competition with plain
5

tiffs for work from EIMCO amounted to free enterprise competition
for which the defendant cannot be criticised.

Plaintiffs have

again failed to plead an action for which relief can be granted.
Prima Facie Tort
Plaintiffs' allegations of Prima Facie Tort read like a
memorandum rather than a properly framed complaint.

The general

implication is that if one person feels offended by another, there
must certainly be a tort occurring, regardless of the facts of the
situation.

Plaintiffs simply have not alleged any actions of

defendant Reinicke which fall within a statutory limitation period
and have caused damage to plaintiffs.
Racketeering Activity
For a more comprehensive discussion of the racketeering
cause of action, see defendants7 previous Memorandum in support of
Motion to Dismiss. As in the other allegations, plaintiffs ignore
the time factors necessary for the requisite events.

For example,

in order to fall within the Utah Racketeering Act, U.C.A. 76-101601 et seq., at least one event must have occurred after 1981 (the
enactment date of the statute).

All of the events alleged by

plaintiffs, except for the "ongoing conspiracy" and the payments to
other defendants, occurred in 1980. The payments are explained
above, and the "conspiracy" discussed below.
In addition, the last event must have occurred within three
years of the time of filing the action.

U.C.A. 78-12-26(4).

Plaintiffs have failed to plead an effective cause of action which
has satisfied these time requirements and would qualify as an act
6

under U.C.A. 76-10-1602(1).
In the only case interpreting the Utah Racketeering Act,
Bache Halsev Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust,
558 F.Supp 1042 (D.C.Utah 1983), the court held the Utah act to be
more demanding than the Federal RICO Act. Where the federal act
requires proving injury from a pattern of racketeering "with enough
specificity to show there is probable cause the crimes were
committed" by the named defendant, Bache at 1045, under the
stricter standards of the Utah act,
the predicate crimes must be alleged with
particularity. The court can determine whether
the pleadings state a violation of the Utah Act
only if the facts are sufficient to show that
the alleged activity would be illegal in Utah
and would fall into one of the enumerated
categories.
Bache at 1047, emphasis added.
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon their allegations of conspiracy to support their charges of racketeering.

Although conspiracy

falls within the enumerated acts of racketeering, "[s]tanding
alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a cause of action
under the Utah Act."

Bache at 1048.

To effectively allege conspiracy as part of racketeering
activity, the plaintiffs need to show that the parties agreed to
commit two or more episodes in furtherance of the conspiracy. and
that they actually did anything beyond "conspiring".
Even in their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs fail to allege
against these defendants:
(1)

That they agreed to commit two or more such episodes
in furtherance of the conspiracy;
7

(2)

That they did anything beyond conspiring, if drinking
together and otherwising associating with the other
defendants constitutes conspiring;

(3)

A second episode which took place after 1980;

(4)

Any second episode occurring within five years of
of a preceeding one and within three years of the
filing of the action;

(5)

Any satisfactory allegation, with sufficient
particularity, of an enumerated racketeering activity.

Any allegations of an "ongoing" conspiracy must show facts
indicating that the conspiracy is, in fact, currently engaged in
by the parties and causing damage to the plaintiffs.

Allegations

of past events, especially ones for which statutes of limitation
have run, do not indicate that a "conspiracy" is actively agreed to
and engaged in by the parties.
Plaintiffs have failed to meet the time limitations imposed
by statute to bring a cause of action for racketeering.

In addi-

tion, they have failed to allege a satisfactory set of elements to
make out the racketeering cause of action.
Violation of Contract Obligations
Plaintiffs7 allegations under this heading appear to be for
conversion, which was discussed above.

This cause of action also

fails to fall within the statutory period of limitation and is
further barred by the doctrines of laches and waiver.
Moreover, the proper forum for this particular cause of
action would be in the court hearing Reinicke's previously filed
action against these plaintiffs for breach of contract.

The

"violation of contract obligations" should be raised in that forum
8

as a counter-claim rather than in this court as a separate cause of
action.
Division of Partnership and Accounting
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are, in fact,
legal partners of defendant Reinicke.

To begin with, defendant

Allison Garland did not have a partnership interest in the business
with defendant Reinicke.

Even if she did have such an interest,

she could not have validly transferred that partnership interest to
another party without the dissolution of the partnership and the
new parties forming a new partnership.

Plaintiffs did not, in

fact, enter into a partnership agreement with defendant Reinicke
and therefore have no partnership interest which gives rise to the
provisions cited by plaintiffs.
THE ENUMERATED CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT GARLAND
All of the above discussion of the causes of action against
defendant Reinicke also apply to plaintiffs' causes of action
against defendant Allsion Garland and are herein incorporated as
they apply.
Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that, by merely
saying so, they can impute to another defendant, Allison Garland,
all of the activities alleged against defendant Reinicke.

This

appears to fall under the "guilty by association" theory.

Simply

knowing of the activities of another defendant, if that in fact was
the case, does not amount to participating in the same activity to
the same degree.
The conspiracy allegations fail due to the arguments set
9

forth above.

The other allegations against this defendant are

barred from becoming a cause of action by the various statutes of
limitation involved.

Plaintiffs have failed to allege any factual

circumstances which would state a cause of action against this
defendant for which relief can be granted.
The "Violation of Contract" alleged against defendant
Garland does not constitute a cause of action.

If defendant

Garland could have and did transfer her interest to plaintiffs,
they have no rights against her for division and accounting.
Since, in fact, defendant Garland could not, under the laws of
Utah, transfer her interest in the partnership to plaintiffs,
plaintiffs still have no right to a division and accounting.
Plaintiffs have failed to allege any other contractual facts which
would amount to this "Violation of Contract."
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have failed to amend their complaint to plead a
satisfactory cause of action against these defendants.

They have

failed to remove the defamatory and irrelevant material.

They have

alleged no facts occuring within the applicable statutes of limitations.

They have not plead sufficient causes of action for which

this court can grant relief.
Because plaintiffs' claims are all barred by the running of
statutory periods of limitation and because plaintiffs are unable
to amend their complaint to make out satisfactory causes of action,
the complaint against defendants Helmut E. Reinicke and Allison
Garland should be dismissed with prejudice.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1986.

C. Reed Brown
Attorney for defendants Helmut
Reinicke and Allison Garland
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, postage
prepaid, on the
day of December, 1986 to:
Loren D. Martin
Attorney for plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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